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The  Regulation Issue
Ralph  Bradburd
On balance, it is no. obvious that developing  countries will
obtain any  significant improvemenits in  allocative efficiency
from  regulating natural monopolies  after privatization. This
suggests  that  greater  consideration  must  he  given to  other
objectives of regulation including distributional concerns and
the creation of confidence in the stability of the environment for
business.
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Introduction
Many LDCs are currently considering efforts to privatize
public enterprise natural monopolies that produce services
corresponding to those of regulated "utilities" in the United
States: electricity generation, transmission and distribution;
water and sewer services; telephony services; and natural gas
distribution.  If there is not at present any apparatus for
regulation of private monopolies, these countries face a
difficult choice: whether to permit inefficient public
enterprises to continue to operate, to create a regulatory
apparatus, or to replace public enterprise monopolies with
unrecqulated  private monopolies.
There are several objectives that may be served by
regulating monopolies, and the socially optimal regulatory choice
will clearly be a function of the rates at which society is
willing and able to make tradeoffs between them.  Let us consider
some possible regulatory objectives.
One important goal of regulation is to reduce the extent of
allocative inefficiency--the deadweight losses of monopoly.  This
is the aspect of monopoly regulation that has traditionally
attracted the attention of neoclassical economists.
Greater distributional equity, or income redistribution more
generally, is a second objective of regulation; this normally
takes the form of constraining the monopolist's ability to
extract surplus from consumers.  Economists have not devoted3
great  attention  to this  objective  of regulation,  neverthelessi
historically,  it  has played  an important  role in the
establishment  of regulatory  institutions.
A third  objective  of monopoly  regulation  is to encourage
consumption  of the regulated  good through  constraints  on the
producing  firm's  pricing.  The goal  here is  more than simple
redistribution  designed  to increase  the  welfare  of some  target
group,  which could  in principle  be effected  by a cash  grant  that
would  enable  the consumers  to purchase  the (socially)  desired
amount  of the good in question  if they  wished  to do so; rather,
the social  objective  is actually  increased  consumption  of the
good in question,  either  because  it is a merit  good  such  as
health  care  or because  it is a good such  as local  telephony
services  that is characterized  by significant  network (or  other)
externalities. Historically,  this regulatory  objective  has also
been quite  important.
A  fourth  reason  for  establishing  regulatory  institutions  is
to create  confidence  in the stability  of the environment  in  which
business  activitiew  7.1st  take  place.  The constraints  imposed  by
public  regulation  o..  monopoly  may not  be the first-best  choice  of
a firm  that  might  be regulated,  but they  may be preferable  to the
kind of institutional  uncertainty  that  accompanies  the complete
absence  of articulated  public  policy,  particularly  in an
environment  that is politically  dynamic. Although  this function
of regulation  has not received  much attention  in the past,  the
enormous  institutional  changes  occurring  in Eastern  Europe  and4
LDCs may increase the attention it receives in the future.
In some circumstances, pursuing the first of these
objectives will also further the others; in other circumstances,
there may be tradeoffs between them.  For example, if a
monopoli3t practices uniform pricing and maxirizes short run
profits, setting the appropriate price ceiling may well reduce
static allocative inefficiencyl,  transfer surplus from the
monopolist to consumers, and increase consumption of the
regulated good.  In contrast, if the monopolist's normal
practices involve very effective price discrimination, efforts to
achieve the second through fourth regulatory objectives listed
above are likely to increase allocative inefficiency, which would
have  .een  near zero in the unregulated environment.
In this paper we will focus our attention on jvst the first
of these regulatory objectives: reducing the allocative
inefficiency associated with monopoly pricing.  We do so because
improvement in allocative efficiency is the aspect of monopoly
regulation that has received the most attention from economists
and also because, whatever regulatory objectives actually
motivate the establishment of monopoly regulation, allocative
efficiency is frequently the motivation that is claimed.  If
public enterprise natural monopolies are to be privatized, and if
resources must be expended in regulating them, then suund public
policies must reflect an appreciation of regulation's costs and
1 This  assumes that the deadweight losses avoided are greater
than the cost of the regulatory apparatus.5
benefits in terms of the allocative efficiency objective as well
as an understanding of the possible conflicts between &llocative
afficiency and the other objectives, particularly distributional
equity. If regulation's  effect  on allocativa  efficiency  turn out
to be incertain,  the  policy  debate  and research  need  to be
refocused on the other regulatory objectives.
In theory,  regulation  of private  natural  monopolies  can
improve  the efficiency  of the economy.  In practice,  sometimes  it
does,  other  times  it does  not.  Therefore,  we ask two questions:
1. How great  would  the allocative  efficiency  losses  be, if any,
if a public  enterprise  natural  monopoly  were  privatized  and
allowed  to function  as an unregulated  entity?  and 2. How much of
an improvement  in performance  could  be expected  if the privatized
natural  monopoly  operated  as a "regulated"  firm?
Public  enterprises  presumably  have less  incentive  to
maximize  profits.  To the extent  that this  causes  public
enterprises  to abstain  from  exploiting  their  ability  to elevate
price  above  marginal  cost,  society  benefits  from  the reduction  in
monopoly  deadweight  losses. However,  if a lack  of concern  with
profit  maximization  takes  the form  of inattention  to minim'zing
costs,  society  bears  the burden.  If we assume  that  a private
monopoly  will  be more likely  to maximize  profits  than  a public
enterprise,  then from  a policy  perspective,  it is clearly
important  to have  some idea  whether  the production  efficiencies
that  might  be gained  from  privatization  of a public  enterprise
natural  monopoly  will  be sufficient  to compensate  for anyallocative  efficiency  losses  that occur.
This study  will first  consider  the extent  of the social
lossas  or gains  that  may occur  when a public  enterprise  natural
monopoly  is rnplaced  by an unregulated  private  monopoly. We do
this  by simulating  welfare 2 losses  from  unregulated  monopoly
assuming  reasonable  bounds  for  demand  elasticities,  monopoly
price increases,  and relative  production  efficiencies  of public
and private  monopolies. Next  we will consider  the potential
allocative  efficiency  gains  or losses  arising  from  public
regulation  of the privatized  natural  monopoly. We conclude  with
some  general  comments  regarding  optimal  regulatory  policies.
II. Deregulated  Private  Monopoly  vs. Public  EnterDrise
In analyzing  the effects  of natural  monopoly  privatization
and  deregulation,  it will  be useful  to distinguish  between  static
and dynamic  consequences. We will  begin  our analysis  by
considering  static  efficiency,  and then  will  go on to weigh  the
importance  of some  dynamic  efficiency  considerations.
A. Static  Efficiency  Considerations:
2  When we speak of "social  welfare"  gains or losses  in the
discussion  below,  we refer  to changes  in the sum of consumer  and
producer  surplus.7
Under  the heading  of static  effects,  we must consider  three
factors:  1.  welfare  losses  due to allacative  inefficiency  of
monopoly  pricing;  2. welfare  gains  or losies  due to changes in
firms'  efficiency,  and 3. distributional  effects  of monopoly
pricing.  We will  consider  these  in turn.
The extent  of the  welfare  losses  that  might  arise  due to
utility  sector  monopoly  pricing  following  privatization  is
obviously  of critical  importance. If these  are  very small  even
in the absence  of post-privatization  efficiency  improvements,  it
is difficult  to make a strong  case  either  for  continued  public
ownership  or for  post-privatization  regulation.
We will  begin our  analysis  of the losses  that  might  occur
when an unregulated  private  firm  replaces  a public  enterprise
natural  monopoly  by assuming  that  the private  monopolist  cannot
practice  any form  of price  discrimination. That is,  the firm
must charga  a uniform  prtce  for all  units  of output  sold  to all
customers. Then  we will consider  the impact  of assuming  that  the
privatized  monopoly  will engage  in systematic  price
discrimination.
1. Uniform  Monopoly  Pricing
In estimating  the range  of welfare  losses  consequent  to
privatization,  we have employed  a  variant  of the Hare.erger  (1954)
technique,  which involves  some  formulaic  computation  combined
with sensitivity  analysis. Because  the results  vary with  the
parameter  values  assumed,  it is important  to review  the8
underlying assumptions of the approach.
For simplicity, the model we employ assumes constant
marginal costs in the relevant range of production and a linear
demand curve.  It also assumes that prior to privatization, the
public enterprise produced the "competitive" or "socially
optimal" output, i.e. that at which price equaled marginal cost.
We assume that the private unregulated firm that replaces the
public enterprise produces the output that maximizes short run
profit  in the absence of price discrimination.
Taken together, these assumptions imply that the private
monopolist's output  (in  physical units) will always be exactly
one half the output of the public enterprise for any level of
marginal cost.  Further, they imply that every possible public
enterprise equilibrium output is associated with a unique price
elasticity of demand  (depending upon where on the linear demand
curve it is located) and that for each pre-privatization demand
elasticity we can determine the percentage increase in price that
will occur after the public enterprise is replaced with the
private unregulated monopoliat.
Thus, our assumptions allow us to create a schedule that
associates.  pre-privatization price elasticities with  (maximum)
post-privatization percentaae price increases.  We provide this
in Table 1.
As is evident in Table 1, if the public enterprise were
producing at a point where the short run demand elasticity was9
very low 3,  the private  monopoly's  shift  to short  run profit
maximizing  pricing  will lead  to  a  very large  percentage  increase
in price.  Conversely,  the higher  the pre-privatization
elasticity,  the  smaller  the percentage  price  incre;'se.  Some  of
the percentage  price  increases  seem  extremely  large,  but
depending  upon initial  conditions,  they  are not
infeasible.
The relation  between  demand  elasticity  and percenta4e  price
increase  is  quite important. The  schedule  in Table 1  allows  us
to employ  a variant  of tha  well-known  Harberger  formula  to
calculate  the deadweight  loss  resulting  from  the shift  to
monopoly  pricing.
The Harberger  (1954)  formula  for  the deadweight  losses  due
to the allocative  inefficiency  of monopoly  pricing  is
'.  - }*P*Q*e*d  (1)
where:  P =  the competitive  price;
Q =  the competitive  output;
e - the  price  elasticity  of demand  for  the
monopolized  product;  and
d =the  percentage  increase  in the price  of the
product  consequent  to monopoly.
In the analysis  below,  we modify  the Harberger  formula
3 Recall -r assumption  that  public  enterprises  prcduce  where
price equals  utrginal  cost.  Thus, in terms  of a demand  curve,  a
low  pre-privatization  demand  elasticity  implies  that  price  equals
marainal  cost  well  below  the  mid-point  of the demand  curve. With
a linear  demand  curve,  the  elasticity  at  any  given  price  will  equal
the distance  along  the ordinate  axis from  the origin  to the that
price,  divided  by the distance  from  that  price  to price  intercept
of the demand  curve.10
TABLE  1
PERCENTAIE  PRICE  CHANGES  AFTER  PIUVATIZATION  CORRESPONDING























(Note:  a 450%  price  increase  should  be  interpreted  to mean  that
the  new  prlce  is 5.5 times  the  old price.)11
slightly  in order  to measure  welfare  losses  as a percentage  of of
industry  sales  measured  at the  competitive  price  and
output.4
Table  2 below  provides  estimates  of the  welfare  loss (as
percentage  of industry  sales)  that  would  occur  if a competitive
pricing  public  enterprise  were  replaced  by - short  run  profit
maximizing  uniform  pricing  monopolist. Column  1 is the pre-
privatization  demand  elasticity;  column  2 is the post-
privatization  percentage  price tncrease;  and column  3 is the
welfare  loss  due to monopoly  pricing  expressed  as a percentage  of
industry  sales. We will return  to columns  4 to 6  momentarily.
The first  thing  to note in Table  2 is that the simulated
losses  due to monopoly  pricing  vary greatly. With  a price
increase as  large as 93%, the deadweight loss is  about 23% of
industry  sales. A 41%  price  increase  would  cause  a deadweight
loss  of about  10%  of industry  sales,  and a 21%  price  increase
produces a deadweight loss of about 5% of industry sales.
Although  we will return  to this  subject  later,  we should  note
here  t'.at  this table  provides  information  on the range  of the
benefits  that could  be obtained  from  regulating  the privatized
4 In some  circumstances  it  may  be useful  to consider  welfare
changes  as a  percentage  of GDP.  This is readily  accomplished  by
multiplying  the  welfare  loss (or  gain)  as a percentage  of industry
output by  the share of GDP  accounted for by the  industry in
question.  As is evident in Appendix 1,  the utilities sector
accounts for a  relatively  modest share of GDP  in developing
countries  --around  1 to 2 percent--  and therefore  welfare  changes
as  a percent  of GDP are likely  to be quite  small.12
TABLE 2
SOCIAL  WELFARE  GAINS  OR LOSSES  FROM
PRIVATE  MONOPOLY  OPERATION  OF
NATURAL  MONOPOLIES
(1)  (2)  (3 )  (4)  (5)  (6)
PERCENT  SOCIAL  WELFARE  SOCIAL  WELFARE  CHANGE
CHANGE  CHANGE AS  %  AS  %  OF  INDUSTRY  OUTPUT
PRICE  IN  OF  INDUSTRY  IF  COSTS  DECLINE  BY:
ELASTICITY  PRICE  OUTPUT
0.1  0.2  0.3
0.111111  450.00  -112.50  -104.96  -97.33  -89.62
0.176471  283.33  -70.83  -63.27  -55.57  -47.74
0.25  200.00  -50.00  -42.41  -34.62  -26.66
0.333333  150.00  -37.50  -29.87  -22.00  -13.88
0.428571  116.67  -29.17  -21.51  -13.52  -5.22
0.538462  92.86  -23.21  -15.51  -7.41  1.10
0.666667  75.'0  -18.75  -11.00  -2.75  6.00
0.818182  61.11  -15.28  -7.47  0.95  9.98
1  50.00  -12.50  -4.63  4.00  13.38
1.222222  40.91  -10.23  -2.27  6.61  16.40
1.5  33.33  -8.33  -0.27  8.92  19.23
1.857143  26.92  -6.73  1.47  11.05  22.04
2.333333  21.43  -5.36  3.02  13.14  25.02
3  16.67  -4.17  4.46  15.33  28.46
4  12.50  -3.13  5.88  1'i.88  32.88
5.666667  8.82  -2.21  7.42  21.29  39.42
9  5.56  -1.39  9.49  27.11  51.49
Note:  This  table  embodies  the  following  assumptions:  constant  marginal  cost
the relevant  range  of production;  a linear  demand  curve;  price  equal t
marginal  cost prior  to natural  monopoly  privatization;  short  run profi
maximizing  behavior  by the privatized  natural  monopoly;  no price
discrimination;  no pyramiding  welfare  effects  of cost  distortions
involving  downstream  purchasers  of the natural  monopoly's  products.13
natural monopoly.5  Column 3 gives the deadweight loss of
monopoly pricing relative to a public enterprise that produces
the socially optimal output, that at which price equals marginal
cost.  Absent efficiency improvements, the most that one could
hope for from regulation is that the regulated firm would produce
the socially optimal output, so the figures in column 3 tell us
the benefits perfect regulation can provide.
To this point, we have assumed that a private monopoly is no
more efficient than a public enterprise.  However, there is a
significant body of literature arguing that public enterprises
are less efficient than privately owned firms, and we need to
take this into account in framing our analysis.
a. Efficiency Gains from Privatization
i.  Theory
In evaluating the effects of changing from public enterprise
provision of natural monopoly services to provision by private
unregulated firms, we have to this point focused on allocative
efficiency issues, implicitly assuming that there are no
differences in the efficiency with which private and public
enterprises produce their output.  If the production techniques
of private profit-oriented firms are more efficient than those of
public enterprises, the cost-savings resulting from private
ownership might offset or even outweigh any deadweight welfare
S  This assumes no efficiency changes after privatization, an
issue to which we will turn immediately below.14
losses  due to monopoly  pricing. We must  therefore  examine  some
theory  and  evidence  relating  to the relative  efficiency  of public
enterprises  and private  fl-ms.
"Efficiency"  is a broad  term.  A firm  could  be "inefficient"
because  it fails  to choose  the appropriate  capital/labor  ratio
given  technological  opportunities  and  given  relative  factor
prices;  it could  be "inefficient"  because  it uses  more inputs
than necessary  to produce  a given  level  of output (even  if it
uses them in the "right"  proportions),  or equivalently,  because
it produces  less  output  than it could  for  a given  level  of input
use; and it could  be "inefficient"  because  it overpays  for  the
inputs  it uses.  Economists  have  attempted  to distinguish  between
these  kinds  of efficiency. However,  in practice  they tend  to
meld  together,  and so we will simply  equate  differences  in
inefficiency  with  differences  in cost  for any  given  level  of
output.
There  are several  reasons  to believe  that  public  enterprises
will be less  efficient  that  private  enterprises  producing  the
same  products  First  and foremost,  there  is no residual  claimant
in a public  enterprise  who receives  the profits. 6 Consequently,
there is nobody  who has a strong  interest  in ensuring  that  the
difference  between  revenues  and costs  is as large  as possible.
To the contrary,  if the outside  auditing  of the  public  enterprise
6  Borcherding  et al.  (1982)  discuss both "property  rights
failure"  and  "public choice"  explanations for  the  greater
inefficiency  of public enterprises.  They do not  find either
approach  entirely  convincing.15
is relatively  ineffective,  its  employees  (at  all levels)  have  an
incentive  to capture  as many rents  within  the firm  as is
possible. To be sure,  this  problem  exists  in private firms  as
well as public  enterprises,  as the large  "managerial  firms"
literature  attests. However,  the extent  of internal  rent capture
is likely  to be much smaller  in private  firms. 7
A second  reason  that  public  enterprises  are likely  to be
less  efficient  than  private  firms  is that  their  managers  are
largely  shielded  from  the effects  of the  market  for corporate
control. For better  or worse,  managers  of private  firms  are
forced  to keep  profits  up by the fear  that  low earnings  will
encourage  a corporate  takeover. This threat  is absent  for  public
enterprises.
A third  reason  for  greater  relative  public  enterprise
inefficiency  is that  managers  must often  try to satisfy  multiple
objectives  determined  by politicians. When  there  are multiple
objectives  and no clear  rules  as to the optimal  trade-offs
between  them,  it is difficult  to measure  performance. If
performance  cannot  be measured,  then  employees  are freer  to
engage  in internal  rent  capture.
"Soft  budget  constraints"  of public  enterprises  also  play a
role  in promoting  inefficiency. Managers  and employees  of public
enterprises  are aware  that  shortfalls  in revenues  relative  to
7  A recent study (Bradburd  et al., 1991) of internal  rent
capture  in  American  firms  found  that  employees  are  able  to capture
about  14%  of the  potential  profits  in  the form  of  higher  wages  and
benefits.16
costs  can be remedied by recourse to government subsidies.  This
affects employees' behavior in seeking greater compensation and
lighter workloads, and managers' behavior in resisting them.
Further, managers are not unaware that efforts to cut costs and
earn a surplus in the current period may be rewarded with nothing
more than a corresponding cutback in government support in the
future.
Finally, the risk-reward structure in public enterprises is
less encouraging to risk-taking and innovation than is true in
private enterprises.  Without the potential for large gains,
there is very little incentive to take risks that might result in
failure.  This latter problem affects dynamic efficiency rather
than static efficiency, but is sufficiently important to require
mention.
ii. Evidence
There have been many studies of the relative efficiency of
public and private enterprises.  These span many industries and
many countries.  A very thorough review of the literature was
performed by Borcherding et al. in 1982,8  in which they survey
the results of over fifty intra-industry studies of the relative
efficiency of private and public firms.  As they report, of the
more than fifty studies, only three studies found public firms
8  A book on the subject of public enterprise economics  (Bos,
1986) published  in 1986 makes numerous references to Borcherding
et al., suggestir. that no major changes in thinking occurred in
the intervening period.17
produce  at lower  cost  than  private  firms,  and two of these  three
studies  were considered  invalid  because  the public  firms  were not
producing  the same  product  as the  private  firms.
In the electric  utilities  sector,  three  of four  studies
found  public firm  production  to be more _ostly  than  private
production. One study  found  public  production  costs  to be 40 to
75% higher,  with investment  levels  40%  higher  per kWh for  public
firms. 9 For water  utilities,  three  studies  found  private  firms
to be more efficient  than  public  firms  by amounts  ranging  from
15% to 40%.  In non-utility  industries,  several  studies  found
efficiency  differences  greater  than 50%.
Taken  together,  the studies  reviewed  by Borcherding  et al.
offer  quite  convincing  evidence  that  private  firms  are  more
efficient  than  public  firms,  and that  this  holds  true in a number
of different  country  settings  and industries. Further,  the
efficiency  differences  are in  many cases  very large.
iii.  Impact  on Simulated  Welfare  Losses
The theory  and  evidence  concerning  the  production
inefficiency  of public  entemprises  relative  to privately  owned
firms  suggest  that  we should  consider  how total  surplus  is
affected  when a competitive  pricing  public  enterprise  is replaced
by a  monopolistic  private  firm  that sets  its  price  to maximize
9 The one anomalous  study  among  those  reviewed  in  the survey
article  occurs  in the  electric  utility  industry. This  study  found
weak evidence  that  private firms  had higher  costs  of production.18
short run profit but that is also more efficient in producing its
outptt.
This analysis is more complicated than the last.  As noted
by Oliver Williamson  (1968a, 1968b, 1969) and others, if a
monopolist is a more efficient producer than the  (more
competitive) firm(s) it replaces, the net change in total surplus
depends upon the relative values of both the deadweight loss of
monopoly pricing and the resource savings made possible by more
efficient production.  Further, because the monopolist's marginal
cost is lower, for any given initial price elasticity, the
percentage  increase in price due to monopoly pricing will be
lower than that shown in column 2.
The formula employed to calculate the net welfare loss (or
gain) is given in Appendix 2.  It is similar in concept to that
of Williamson  (1968b), though altered to present the welfare
changes as a percentage of the value of industry output evaluated
at  the competitive price and output.
Column 4 of Table 2 provides estimates of the change in
social welfare  (measured as a percentage of industry output) for
each initial elasticity if a competitive pricing  (P  =  MC) public
enterprise is replaced by a profit maximizing monopolist that has
10% lower marginal costs of production.  Several items are
noteworthy.  For initial elasticities of 1.5 or less, the welfare
losses of private monopoly are reduced somewhat.  For initial
elasticities of 1.5 or greater, the privatization actually
results in increased total surplus, though the improvements are19
relatively modest.
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the exercise of column 4, except that
they assume efficiency improvements relative to the public
enterprise of, respectively, 20% and 30%.  Here, it is only in
the cases of the lowest elasticitiss --those that would have
produced monopoly price increases of 75% and more in the absence
of efficiency improvements-- that privatization without
regulation leads to a reduction in total surplus  .he evidence
reviewed above concerning efficiency differences between public
and private enterprises suggests that 20% to 30% improvements in
efficiency following privatization are not unlikely.
As is clear from Table 2, whether or not privatization is
likely to cause a significant drop in social welfare depends upon
the initial price elasticity of demand.  It is therefore useful
to consider some empirical estimates of the demand elasticity for
services produced by natural monopolies.
Lester Taylor  (1975), in a survey article drawing on the
Houthakker-Taylor  (1966) demand elasticity study as well as many
others, reported that the estimated short run price elasticity of
demand for electricity seemed to range from .14 to .90 (in
absolute value) and that the long run elasticity ranged from 1.0
to 2.0.  Further, as Alfred Kahn reports in his treatise on
regulation  (1971,  pp. 102-3), the Houthakker-Taylor and other
studies suggest that the price elasticity is significantly higher
in poorer areas of the United States and abroad.
These elasticity estimates suggest two things.  First, for20
the ranges of demand elasticities found in most developing
countries, the losses due to privatization without regulation are
likely to be quite small; if there are e?ficiency improvements,
countries may even enjoy net gains.10 Second, if private
monopolies practice price discrimination, as we will argue below
is likely, poorer groups in society, with their higher demand
elasticities,  are  leas-  likely  to suffer  significant  losses.
Simulation results are worth no more than their underlying
assumptions.  We must now ask if our approach embodies any
assumptions that might bias our estimates of the costs of
unregulated monopoly.
One aspect of our analysis in Table 2 may lead us to
underestimate the social losses due to unregulated monopoly.  The
figures in columns 3 to 6 of Table 2 assume that all electricity
is sold to final demand.  However, we know that electricity is
sold as an intermediate input to businesses as well as to final
consumer demand.
Holding the demand elasticity constant, the welfare loss
from a given monopoly price distortion for an intermediate input
is likely to be greater than for a final good because the price
distortion becomes a cost distortion that affects downstream
output decisions.  Depending upon the model employed, the welfare
10 We note again here that our use of "social welfare losses"
(or "gains") refers to changes in combined consumer and producer
surplus.21
losses  can be as much as 40%  higher 1llwhich would  suggest  that
the welfare losses in Table 2 are underestimated.
Table  3 below  assumes  that all  monopoly  price  distortions
cause  deadweight  losses  40% larger  than  those  in Table  2.  It is
important  to note  that  because  the effect  is proportional,  for
most elasticity  values  and/or  elasticity-efficiency  improvement
combinations,  unregulated  monopoly's  effect  on social  welfare
remains  very small.
There  is another  factor  that  might seem  to increase  the
social  cost  of monopoly  pricing  of utilities  services. The
elasticity  of demand  for electricity  and other  utility-like
natural  monopoly  services  is higher  for industrial  use than for
consumer  final  demand. Therefore,  because,  as equation (1)  above
shows,  welfare  losses  are proportional  to the elasticity  of
demand,  the total  welfare  losses  might  seem  more appropriately
located  in the viLinity  of the larger  rather  than  smaller  values
in columns  3 to 6.  This effect  could  appear  to be significant  in
LDCs,  where  the proportion  of electricity,  gas or telephony
services  sold  as an intermediate  input  is almost  certainly  higher
than it is in industrialized  countries. 12
We do not think  this is a serious  problem.  Industrial  use
lScherer  and  Ross (1990,  pp. 665-667)  discuss  this issue  in
some  detail.
12 In 1972, in the United  States,  intermediate  input  use of
electricity  accounted  for about 54% of total electricity  demand.
(See U.S.  Department of  Commerce, The  Detailed InRut-Output
Structure of the U.S. Economy: 1972.  (Washington,  U.S.G.P.Ot
1979):  173-178.22
TABLE 3
SOCIAL  WELFARE GAINS OR LOSSES  FROM
PRIVATE MONOPOLY OPERATION  OF
NATURAL  MONOPOLIES  WITH EXPECT
OF PYltAMIDING  VERTICA  DISTORTIONS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
PERCENT  SOCIAL  WELFARE  SOCIAL  WELFARE  CHANGE
CHANGE  CHANGE AS  %  AS  % OF  INDUSTRY  OUTPUT
PRICE  IN  OF  INDUSTRY  IF  COSTS  DECLINE  BY:
ELASTICITY  PRICE  OUTPUT
0.1  0.2  0.3
0.111111  450  -157.50  -148.96  -140.36  -131.67
0.176471  283.333  -99.17  -90.61  -81.94  -73.15
0.25  200  -70.00  -61.42  -52.67  -43.77
0.333333  150  -52.50  -43.89  -35.07  -26.03
0.428571  116.667  -40.83  -32.19  -23.28  -14.08
0.538462  92.8571  -32.50  -23.82  -14.80  -5.42
0.666667  75  -26.25  -17.53  -8.38  1.20
0.818182  61.1111  -21.39  -12.62  -3.33  6.50
1  50  -17.50  -8.68  0.80  10.93
1.222222  40.9091  -14.32  -5.42  4.27  14.76
1.5  33.3333  -11.67  -2.68  7.28  18.22
1.857143  26.9231  -9.42  -0.32  9.99  21.51
2.333333  21.4286  -7.50  1.76  12.53  24.83
3  16.6667  -5.83  3.64  15.07  28.44
4  12.5  -4.38  5.43  17.83  32.83
5.666667  8.82353  -3.09  7.25  21.28  38.99
9  5.55556  -1.94  9.48  26.76  49.88
Note:  This table embodies  the same assumptions  as the previotus  table except
that it assumes that the pyramiding vertical distortion effects of
intermediate  good  price distortions increase  the welfare losses of
monopoly pricing by 40 percent.23
of natural  monopoly  services  as intermediate  inputs  plays  a role
in determining  which  elasticity  price-increase  combinations  are
likely. The elasticity  of demand  for intermediate  input  demand
is higher  because  industrial  users  have  greater  substitution
possibilities  than  private  residential  users,  including
generating  their  own power.  This  clearly  constrains  monopolies'
ability  to raise  prices  significantly,  and therefore  probably
rules  out in practice  the larger  percentage  price increases  in
the upper  part of Tables  2 and 3.
For at least  some  reasonable  elasticity  values  in Tables  2
and 3,  monopoly  pricing  app^ars  to produce  non-negligible  costs,
even if the private  monopoly  produces  more efficiently  than  the
public  enterprise  it replaces. However,  just  as our simulation
assumptio  a  might  cause  us to underestimate  the social  costs  of
private  unregulated  monopoly,  they  can also  cause  us to
overestimate  them.  Two of our assumptions  have  this effect.
We have assumed  in the above  analysis  that  the public
enterprises  price  their  products  at marginal  cost.  To the extent
that  this is not the case,  the welfare  loss  estimates  are lower.
If the privatized  public  enterprise  was pricing  its product  below
marginal  cost,  the  price  was actually  being  set inefficiently
low,  and the allocative  efficiency  losses  are  not as large  as a
straightforward  application  of the Harberger  formula  would
suggest. However,  it is much  more likely  that the  public
enterprise  was setting  its  price  above  marginal  cost.  In this
case, it  was already  acting  to some  degree  like  a monopolist,  and24
therefore, for any initial price elasticity, the private
monopolist's percentage price increase would be smaller.  The
welfare losses would be correspondingly smaller.
We have also assumed that the private unregulated monopolist
considers only the maximization of short run profit in setting
price.  Clearly, in an industry where tha long run price
elasticity is significantly greater than the short run
elasticity, this is not a rational strategy.  Consumers can
adjust their patterns of electricity, water, or telephony
consumption just as they adjusted to high oil prices by
purchasing more efficient automobiles and heating systems.
Further, as we have seen in the case of telephony, entry is not
impossible even in sectors long considered naturally
monopolistic.  These longer run considerations will significantly
affect the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy.  Thus,the
estimates in Tables 2 and 3 almost certainly exaggerate the
losses due to monopoly and underestimate the gains from
efficiency improvements.
On balance then, we would argue that even with single-price
monopoly pricing and without any significant efficiency
improvements, static welfare losses are likely to be no more than
)0 to 15 percent of the value of pre-privatization output.  These
are not wholly insignificant figures, but neither do they suggest
a crippling of the economy.  Further, it is important to ncte
that if even relatively modest efficiency improvements accompany
privatization, welfare losses are replaced by gains.25
2. Price  Discrimination
To this  point  in our analysis  of tha deadweight  losses  of
unregulated  monopoly  pricing,  we have  assumed  that  the monopolist
would  be unable  or unwilling  to price  discriminate  among
customers  or groups  of customers. Given  the possibilities  for
profitable  price  discrimination  in the  natural  monopoly
situations  we are considering,  this  seems  an unlikely
eventuality. Even in the early  part of the  twentieth  century,
(unregulated)  utilities  in the  United  States  were able  to
implement  price  discrimination  practices  (Shepherd  and Wilcox,
passim);  today,  with firms'  ability  to determine  customer  groups'
reservation  prices  or demand  elasticities  so much  greater,  and
with the costs of monitoring customer usage so much lower, it is
hard  to imagine  that  a profit-maximizing  unregulated  monopoly
would  make  the sacrifice  in profits  necessitated  by charging  a
uniform  price  to all customers  for all  units  of output.
Price  discrimination  will  have an impact  on income
distribution  and on static  allocative  efficiency. Let us  examine
these  effects  in  turn.
Systematic  monopoly  price  discrimination  always  has the
effect  of sh-.fting  surplus  from  consumers  to the  monopolist,  else
the monopolist  would  practice  uniform  pricing. Given  the likely
patterns  of asset  ownership  in LDCs  and the patterns  of
residential  and industrial  use of utility  services,  this
effectively  means  that  price  discrimination  will increase  real
income  inequality,  and  this  would  almost  certainly  be viewed  as26
undesirable. It should  be noted,  however,  that in many countries
the poorest  citizens  have  very limited  access  to utilities
services,  or none  at all.  The effect  of monopoly  price
discrimination  on their  rcal  income  is therefore  likely  to be
small.  Nevertheless,  if there  were no compensating  allocative
efficiency  advantages  of price  discrimination,  requiring
unregulated  monopolies  to practice  uniform  pricing  might  seem an
attractive  policy.
Price  discrimination  can either  increase  or decrease  static
allocative  efficiency. As is well-known,  simple  first  and second
degree  price  discrimination  always  increase  output  relative  to
the uniform  price  monopoly  profit  maximizing  equilibrium  and
therefore  reduce  the static  deadweight  welfare  losses  due to
monopoly.  In the case  of first  degree  price  discrimination,
where  each  unit of output  is sold  at its  reservation  price,
output is expanded to the point where marginal cost is exactly
equal  to  price,  and there  is no monopoly  deadweight  loss  at all.
The effects  of third  degree  price  discrimination  depend'3upon
demand  and cost  conditions,  and cannot  be generalized.
The non-linear  pricing  systems  such  as two-part  or multi-
part  tariffs  that  are employed  by regulated  utilities  in  the
United  States  are forms  of second  degree  price  discrimination;  as
such,  they  have  the effect  of improving  economic  efficiency
13  Third  degree price  discrimination involves dividing
consumers  into  groups  according  to type and pricing  according  to
group  demand  elasticities.27
precisely  because  they  move output  closer  to the point  where
marginal  cost  equals  price.  If utility-type  natural  monopolies
were  deregulated  in LDCs,  they  would  almost  certainly  want to
implement  non-linear  pricing  schemes,  and consequently,  the
welfare  losses  due to monopoly  pricing  would  be significantly
lower  than those  shown  in Table  1.14
This is  very graphically  demonstrated  in Table  4 below,
which juxtaposes  in two columns  the proportion  of monopoly
deadweight  losses  (DWLs)  avoided  as output  increases  from  the
short  run  monopoly  profit  maximizing  level  in the direction  of
the competitive  output. As is apparent  in the  Harberger  formula
for  deadweight  loss  of monopoly,  in which  the DWL increases  in
proportion  to the sauare  of the  monopoly  price  distortion,  a
disproportionately  large  fraction  of the DWL costs  can  be
avoided  by increasing  output  part of the  way to the competitive
equilibrium. For example,  the DWL is cut in  half  by increasing
output  a third  of the way from  the  monopoly  equilibrium  to the
competitive  equilibrium  output;  it is cut by three-quarters  if
output  is  increased  to a level  halfway  from  the monopoly
equilibrium  to the competitive  equilibrium. Deadweight  losses
are reduced  less  than  10%  by the last  30%  of the total  potential
movement.
14 Regulated  utilities  in the United States  have frequently
been stymied in their efforts to implement  non-linear  pricing
schemes  by state utility  commissions. This has not only led to
inefficient  pricing,  but has also  blocked  the introduction  of new
services  the profitability  of which  depends  upon  use-based  prices.28
Thus, a very large part of the dead'ieight  losses of monopoly
are avoided if the possibility of profitable price discrimination
induces the monopolist to increase output above the monopoly
uniform pricing profit maximizing equilibrium by even a
relatively modest amount.
B. Dynamic Efficiency Considerations:
To this point, we have discussed only whether static
efficiency will increase or decrease if a public enterprise
natural monopoly is replaced by a private unregulated monopoly.
We turn now to dynamic efficiency issues.
The most important dynamic efficiency consideration is
whether an unregulated private natural monopoly will make the
investments necessary to offer the quality of service appropriate
to the country's changing needs over time.  Natural monopolies'
services are an important part of a nation's infrastructure, and
if they are suboptimally provided, this can be an impediment to
growth.15
Economists by now generally agree that, barring extreme
values of either, gains from improvements in dynamic efficiency
will usuaily begin to outweigh static inefficiency losses over a
relatively short time horizon (Scherer and Ross, pp. 682).  If an
unregulated private firm would be significantly more likely to
15 The "public interest" associated with the services of many
natural monopolies was one of the bases for introducing  regulation
of  pricing and output.  See Shepherd and  Wilcox (1979,  pp.287-288).29
TABLE  4
REDUCTIONS  IN DEADWEIGHT
LOSS  AS  OUTPUT  MOVES  PROGRESSIVELY
CLOSER  TO  SOCIALLY  OPTIMAL  LEVEL
(1)  (2)
PROPORTION  %
OF DISTANCE  FROM  DWL














Monopoly  profit  max.  output  0  1.00
Note:  These  figures  assume  linear  demand  and  marginal  cost
curves.30
introduce  product/service  improvements  or cost-saving  innovations
than  would a public  enterprise,  there is a strong  presumption
that absent  strong  distributional  consideration,  private  firm
provision  of  natural  monopoly  services  is preferable  to public
enterprise  provision. Similarly,  if an unregulated  private
monopoly  will be more dynamically  efficient  than a regulated  one,
then  the private  monopoly  is  probably  better  left  unregulated.
There  may be dynamic  efficiency  effects  of price
discrimination  as well.  In  many LDCs,  the quantity  and quality 16
of service  of publicly-owned  utilities  is sub-optimal. Upgrading
service  will  be very costly,  and  private  owners'  upgrading
efforts  may be financially  constrained. The increased  profits
from  price  discrimination  may provide  both  the means  of financing
capital  improvements  and the incentive  to do so.17
16"Quality"  here  subsumes  both  the range  of services  provided
and the reliability  of service  provision.
17  It night be asked why we assume that a privately  owned
natural monopoly would engage in price discrimination  and/or
provide service  improvements  to a  greater  extent  than a publicly
owned firm  would.  Although  publicly  owned  natural  monopolies  do
practice  price  discrimination,  they probably  do not pursue  it as
aggressively  as  would  a  private  firm  for  the same  reason  that  many
public  enterprise  utility  services  were priced artificially  low:
political  expediency.  In the case of service improvements,  the
matter  is  more  complicated,  but  three  factors  probably  play  a  role.
First, the financial  resources  necessary  to expand and upgrade
service must come either from other government  budgets or from
raising  the price of the natural  monopoly's  services,  neither  of
which is politically  appealing.  Second,  governments  may reason
that additional resources provided to natural monopoly public
enterprises  would  be diverted  to the  benefit  of those  enterprises'
employees rather than  used  as  intended.  Third, managerial
initiative may  be  blunted because the  rewards to  individual
managerial  effort  and initiative  in  a  public  enterprise  tend  to be
lower  than in private  profit-oriented  companies.31
Although there will be some negative redistributive effects
of permitting unregulated natural monopolies to engage in price
discrimination, in practice these may not be large.  In this
case, the potential redistributive effects of price
discrimination migh, be outweighed by the potential benefits in
the form of improved static allocative efficiency and dynamic
efficiency effects of service improvement.
We should note here the importance of government assurances
that privatized natural monopolies will not be expropriated in
the future.  Without some confidence that this is true, risk
averse operators of unregulated natural monopolies will attempt
to make as much profit as possible from *.urrent  physical
capacity, increasing short run static efficiency losses in the
process, but will be very reluctant to invest in new physical
plant.  The effect of this will be continued sub-optimal
provision of services.  Given that the "public interest" served
by utilities' products provided much of the rationale for public
operation or regulation of natural monopolies in the first place,
this would clearly be undesirable.18 As the evidence from the
Eastern European economies clearly demonstrates, a low-priced
good or service that is unavailable is not preferable to a higher
JA  Note that multilateral lending organizations may be able
to play an important role in this situation.  If a private utility
is funded to some significant degree by an international lending
organization,  then  the  government  may  view  expropriation  or
confiscatory  regulation as potentially  very costly.  This might
provide  the assurance necessary for private investors to take a
long run view of asset management.32
priced one that is.
III.  Benefits of Regulating Privatized Natural Monopolies
To this point we have focused our attention on whether
society's  losses due to monopoly pricing in a privatized natural
monopoly sector are likely to be large or small.  We have argued
that the static welfare losses of monopoly pricing appear to be
quite modest given reasonable assumptions regarding the price
elasticity of demand for natural monopoly services, the gains
from greater efficiency of private firms, and the likelihood that
unregulated private monopolists will engage in price
discrimination.  If efficiency gains are in the 20% to 30% range,
improvement in static allocative efficiency is a distinct
possibility.  We have further argued that dynamic efficiency
arguments suggest that even if LDCs had to accept some static
efficiency losses in the short run, within a short period of time
these would be outweighed by the dynamic efficiency benefits.
We must now address the question: Could LDCs do even better
by privatizing the public enterprise natural monopolies and then
reoulatinq them to try to ensure that they set price and output
close to the competitive equilibrium?
One way to answer this question is to consider the maximum
benefits that LDCs could obtain from natural monopoly regulation.
Again, Tables 2 and 3 provide some guidance.  Even perfect
regulation can do no more than eliminate the welfare losses of
monopoly.  If we take the middle range of column 3 in either33
Table  2 or 3 to bracket  the likely  range  of welfare  losses  due to
uniform  pricing  monopoly,  this implies  that costless  and perfect
regulation  would  probably  reduce  welfare  losses  by no more than
an amount  equal  to 5% to about  20%  of the  value  of industry
output. If we admit  the  possibility  that  a private  unregulated
monopolist  would implement  a non-linear  pricing  scheme  as a means
of price  discrimination,  the effect  of which is  to substantially
reduce  welfare  losses  due  to monopoly,  then even  if we continue
to assume  no efficiency  gains  after  privatization,  the likely
static  allocative  inefficiency  losses  avoided  by Rerfect  and
costless  regulation  are not likely  to be more than 2% to 10%  of
industry  output.
Unfortunately,  even  in the best  of all worlds,  regulation  is
not costless. In the world  in which  we live,  it does  not
remotely  approach  perfection. Bradburd  and Ross (1991)  provide  a
survey  of the regulatory  experience  in  the United  States;  for  the
most  part, it is a history  of regulatory  misdirection  and
regulatory  failure.
There  are  many reasons  for regulation  to be imperfect.
Perhaps  some  may be minimized  by excellent  design  of regulatory
mechanisms. Others  are almost  impossible  to avoid.
Regulators  do not have access  to good information,  much less
perfect  information,  regarding  demand  and best-practice  cost
conditions. As a consequence  it is only  by chance  that  they  will
set  the optimal  price.  Further,  in an economy  that is undergoing
change,  as one  would  hope  would  be the case in LDCs,  the optimal34
price  is a  moving  target,  making  it  difficult  even  to employ
decision  rules  based  on incrementalism.
Shepherd  and Wilcox (1979,  Chapter  11)  provide  a concise
summary  of what factors  regulators  must try  to take  into  account
when setting  rates  and rate  structures  and  when determining  the
regulated  firm's  allowed  rate  of return. They  also  discuss  many
of the things  that  can and do go wrong  with the  process.  They
conclude  (pp.  315-16)  that serious  problems  with efficiency  and
investment  arise  under  regulation  that  seem  to have  no easy
solution,  and that  in some  cases  the social  costs  of regulation-
4 nducad  inefficiency  are possibly  large  enough  to outweigh
regulation' s benefits.
Shepherd  and  Wilcox  discuss  a number  of problems  gaused  by
regulation. One is a tendency  for  regulators  to come  to defend
the regulated  utilities  against  competition  and to therefore
reinforce  their  monopoly  status. Bradburd  and  Ross (1991)
discuss  some institutional  factors  that  make  this  likely.
A  second  problem  arises  from  the fact  that  regulators  have
imperfect  information. Consequently,  in setting  rates,  they soon
come to rely  upon  a cost-plus  system  under  which  the firm  charges
cost  plus a profit  margin. Such  a system  encourages
inefficiency,  and as Shepherd  and  Wilcox  argue,  because  the
managers  are quite  free  of constraints,  the  degree  of
inefficiency  is likely  to affect  all inputs  and be quite
significant.
This by no means exhausts Shepherd and Wilcox' list of35
problems,  but it suffices  to make clear  that  regulation  is not a
simple  and foolproof  process,  nor one guaranteed  to yield net
benefits.
It is helpful  to once  again  think  about  likely  costs  and
benefits  of regulation. We argued  above  that  the static
efficiency  costs  of unregulated  monopoly  are  unlikely  to be
greater  than  10%  of the  value  of industry  output.  If regulation
operates  in a manner  that increases  the regulated  firm's  costs  by
10% or more relative  to what they  would  be in the absence  of
regulation,  then  regulation  will yield  a net reduction  in static
efficiency  for society  rather  than  a net improvement.
There  is another  potential  problem  with regulation  that
Shepherd  and Wilcox  do not mention,  perhaps  because  it is more
likely  to surface  in a developing  country  context. There  will  be
great  political  pressures  in a developing  country  context  to keep
regulated  products'  prices  low,  reflecting  the second  and
possibly  the third  of the regulatory  objectives  discussed  in the
introductory  paragraphs. The danger  is that if they are set too
low, firms  will lack  the resources  to maintai%  the integrity  of
the services  they  now provide,  much less  have  adequate  resources
to expand  and improve  those  services. The dynamic  efficiency
losses  associated  with this  problem  are likely  to be both  very
costly,  and  very difficult  to avoid.
A. Alternatives  to Direct  Regulation
Competition  is a very inexpensive  and efficient  form  of36
regulation. If all  traditional  natural  monopolies  were in fact
protected  by insurmountable  barriers  to entry,  then  this  very
appealing  method  of preventing  monopoly  pricing  would  be
unavailable. However,  many traditional  natural  monopolies  have
recently  been shown  to be less  naturally  monopolistic  than  was
once  thought  to be the case.  This  is certainly  now the case in
long  distance  telephony,  and  may soon  be in local  telephony  as
well (Bradburd  and Ross,  1991). Changes  in energy  generation  and
co-generation  technology  have  made the  power  sector  more
competitive  as well.  Now, many industrial customers of
electricity  utilities  are capable  of satisfying  their  own needs
without incurring  excessive  costs;  some  even  produce  surplus
power  that  they sell  to utilities.
In effect,  in the absence  of government  protection,  at least
some  degree  of competition  is a real  possibility  for  many
"natural"  monopolies. The figures  presented  in Table  4 above
suggest  that  the bulk of the static  deadweight  losses  associated
with monopoly  will  be avoided  i' privatized  natural  monopolies
must price  their  products  with an eye  to the threat  of potential
competitive  entry,  or to the possibility  that industrial
customers  will find  alternative  methods  of meeting  their  needs.
Non-linear  pricing  schemes  are likely  to reduce  welfare  losses
still  further. It is  difficult  to justify  a complex  regulatory
apparatus,  at least  on efficiency  grounds,  when  market  forces
might  operate  to achieve  the bulk  of the  potential  benefits  of
regulation  without  any of the costs.37
Another  policy  alternative  is to ch,ose  nt  to reulate  at
Rregent,  but to craft  legislation  tnat  w')uld  allow  for regulation
at some  point in the future  if prices  at that  time are found  to
be unreasonably high by international standards.  For  reasons
that  have already  been  discussed,  this  would  probably  have the
effect  of significantly  diminishing  static  inefficiency.
However,  unless  the legislation  were  written in a  way that
provides  great  assurances  against  expropriative  regulation  in the
future,  it  might result  in  underinvestment  and dynamic
inefficiency  more costly  than  the static  inefficiency  avoided.
IV.  Summary
We have argued  'La  this report  that  the deadweight  losses  due
to monopoly  pricing  by unregulated  privatized  natural  monopolies
are likely  to be modest,  and  that they  may well  be outweighed  by
the benefits  of improvements  in efficiency. We have  also  argued
that regulation  is not costless,  and  that it  might  well foster
static  and dynamic  efficiency  losses  greater  than  the deadweight
monopoly  losses  it is intended  to avoid.  on balance,  it is not
obvious  that LDCs  will experience  an increase  in combined
consumer  and  producer  surplus  in either  the short  run or the long
run if their  natural  monopoly  public  enterprises  are regulated
after  privatization.
Our results  do not suggest  much support  for  regulation  on
the basis  of its effect  on allocative  efficiency,  and they
certainly  indicate  the importance  of avoiding  costly  regulatory38
systems. However,  this  does  not necessarily  imply  that
regulation  is socially  undesirable:  as we stated  in our
introduction,  there  are several  possible  objectives  of
regulation. What our results  do sug4est  is the need  to devote
greater  attention  to the other  objectivea  of monopoly  regulation,
especially  those  involving  income  distribution  and investor
confidence  in institutional  stability.
Distributional  consequences  of monopoly  pricing  are
politically  potent. Government  policies  are undoubtedly
influenced  by the fear  that,  unless  privatized  public  enterprisea
are  regulated,  they  will significantly  raise  their  prices  and the
poor  will suffer  as a consequence. It is hard  to implement  good
policies  with inadequate  information,  and unfortunately,  we have
very little  systematic  knowledge  about  the actual  distributional
consequences  of privatization  and deregulation. Research  is
needed  to determine  how price  changes  after  privatization  have
affected  various  income  groups,  and  how those  price  changes
differ  with  the extent  and nature  of regulation.
The role  of regulation  in shaping  the institutional
environment  may also  be important. If natural  monopoly  public
en'erprises  ars privatized  and  unregulated  in an environment  in
which  property  rights  are  not secure,  management  is  very likely
to take an extremely  short  run view  of profit  maximization. The
"take  the money  and run"  policies  implied  by this  will  yield  all
the undesirable  deadweight  loss  and  distributional  consequences
of private  monopoly  and none  of the afficisncy  and service39
improvement benefits.  Attention must be devoted to ensuring an
institutional environment in which firms will have an incentive
to invest substantial resources to improve the quantity and
quality of the services they provide.40
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1990.  (All  data are 1988 except Egypt, for which the figure is
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APPENDIX 2
FORMULA  FOR  CALCULATING  WELFARE GAINS  AND LOSSES
WHEN A MONOPOLY IS MORE EFFICIENT
Let the demand curve be of linear form
Q - a - b*P  ;
and let marginal costs of the public enterprise be constant, so that
MC =  m.
Further assume that the private firm replacing the public enterprise is more
efficient so that its marginal costs of production are lower than those of the
public  enterprise by a constant proportion  equal to the decimal fraction  P.  Thus
the monopolist's marginal costs are given by
MC(M) =  (1-pJ m.
If the public enterprise was producing where marginal cost equals price, then
it can be shown that the net change in total surplus, W, resulting from the
transition from the public enterprise to the monopolist is:
W =  p(mQ(c)/2)(1+p  e)  -
e-(P(c)*(Q(c)/2)  ((P(m)/P(c))p(l/(1+2  e)) (1+2 e-pe)-l] 2
where
p =  the decimal fraction improvement in efficiency ;
e =  the price elasticity of  demand at  the public enterprise price;
P(c) =  the public enterprise price, which is - m;
P(m) =  the monopolist's short run profit maximizing price;
Q(c) =  the public enterprise output; and
P(m) '  the monopolist's short run profit maximizing output.
cont'd44
The  net  change  in  total  surplus, expressed  as  a  percentace  of  pre-
privatization output. is
W' =  100*((W /2)(l+M e) -
(e /2) ((P(m)/P(c)) (l/(1+2 e))  -(1+2  e-,w-e)-1]2)
To take into account the fact that monopoly price distortion of factor inputs
affects resource allocation in downstream production processes, we multiply the
deadweight loss estimates by 1.4.  The total welfare change that occurs when a
(more  efficient)  private  monopoly  replaces  a  competitivoly  pricing  public
enterprise may be expressed as
W'' =  100*((pW/2)(1+,.e) -
(1.4)(e,/2) [(P(m)/P(c)) (l/(1+2  e)) (1+2 e-p e)-1J 2 )Policy  Research  Working Paper  Series
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